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The Board of Editors wish to call the attention of all subAMERICAN LAW REGISTER to the
change made in the department of Book Reviews. This department has been given a wider scope, which is evidenced by its title,
"'turrentLegal Periodicals and Book Reviews."

scribers and readers of the

DEPARTMENT NOTES.
AT THE INVITATION of the Trustees of the University, Hon.
Mayer Sulzberger, President Judge of Court of Common Pleas,
No. 2. of Philadelphia County, delivered an address before the
students and alumni of the Law Department on the "Practice
of the Criminal Law," which is printed in full in this number
of the REGISTER. Immediately after the address a reception was
tendered to Judge Sulzberger by the Society -of the Alumni of
the-Department of Law in the rotunda of the Law School Build355
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ing. A ellation was served. Invitations to the reception were
extended by the Society to all the members of the judiciary in
Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware and to the members
of the Penns'lvania State Bar Association. About four hundred
members of the Bar were present. Hion." William B. Hanna, the
president of the Society, acted as chairman of the Reception
Committee, which consisted of the following members: William
Y. C. Anderson, John C. Bell, George Tucker Bispham, Francis
H. Bohlen, Joseph H. Brinton, Francis Shunk Brown, Jchn
Douglass Brown, Reynolds D. Brown, John Cadwalader, Jr.,
Francis Chapman, Frederick Lewis Clark, Joseph S. Clark,
Henry T. Dechert, Samuel Dickson, Hazard Dickson, John L.
Evans, William C. Ferguson, Henry E. Garsed, John S. Gerhard, H. Laussat Geyelin, Charles F. Gummey, Meredith Hanna,
Harry S. Hopper, George G. Hlorwitz, James Collins Jones, J.
Levering Jones, Murdoch Kendrick, William Draper Lewis,
Charles L. McKeehan, Howard W. Page, George Wharton Pepper, Samuel G. Perkins, Horace Pettit, Eli Kirk Price, Frank
P. Prichard, J. Howard Rhoads, Joseph G. Rosengarten, Horace
M. Rumsey, Fred J. Shoyer, Jacob Singer, Lewis B. Smith,
William H. Staake, Win. M. Stewart, Jr., John J. Sullivai,
Joseph B. Townsend, Jr., Win. J. Turner, Thomas R. White,
Ira Jewell Williams, Sidney Young.
CONSTITUTIONALITY

OF THE PENNSYLVANIA

LIBEL LAW.-

The constitutionality of the new libel act, just approved by the
Governor of Pennsylvania, has been attacked on two grounds:
1. It is said to be contrary to certain provisions in the constitution of Pennsylvania guaranteeing the freedom of the press.
2. It is claimed to be special legislation, and for that reason
obnoxious to the constitution.
(.) The seventh section of the Pennsylvania Bill of Rights
provides, "The printing press, shall be free to every person who
may undertake to examine the proceedings of the legislature or
any branch of government, and no law shall ever be made to
restrain the right thereof. The free communication of thougbts
and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man, and every
man may freely speak, write and print on any subject, being
responsible for the abuse of that liberty." The remainder of
the section relates solely to criminal prosecutions for libel, and
therefore has no bearing upon the law under discussion, which
refers to civil suits for damages only.
The new act makes publishers and editors liable in damages
for publishing alleged facts which are untrue, provided they
have failed to use due diligence in ascertaining their truth or
falsity. The only change is in making publishers liable for
damage resulting from a negligent false statement, whether the
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statement is libellous at common law or not. Whether damages
can result as the natural and probable consequence of a nonlibellous publication is a matter which has not been worked out,
and which is not to be attempted here. But in any event the
only new feature of the law is to create responsibility for a
negligent act.
How is this an infringement of the constitution? The first
clause quoted says the printing press shall be free- and no law
shall ever be made to restrain the right of the citizens to examine
the proceedings of any branch of government. It is probable
that this clause would make impossible a law intended to suppress any publication because of its comments upon public matters, and such was its undoubted purpose. It has been a part of
our fundamental law since 1776, when such proceedings were
not beyond the range of probabilities. But, no one has ever
heretofore contended that it meant to exempt a paper from
civil responsibility for publishing falsehoods. The publication
of falsehoods constitutes no necessary part of the examination of public matters. No stretch of the imagination can make
it so. The clause protects publishers and editors in any proper
non-libellous comments or opinions they may choose to express,
but it goes no further.
As early as 1788 Mr. Chief Justice 'McKean in Respublica
v. Oswald, 1 Dallas, 319, said:
"What then is the meaning of the Bill of Rights, and the
constitution of Pennsylvania, when they declare, 'That the freedorn of the press shall not be restrained,' and 'that the printing
presses shall be free to every person who undertakes to examine
the proceedings of the legislature, or any part of the government?' However ingenuity may torture the expressions, there
can be little doubt of the just sense of these sections: they give
to every citizen a right of investigating the conduct of those who
are entrusted with the public business; and they effectually preclude any attempt to fetter the press by the institution of a
licenser. The same principles were settled in England, so far
back as the reign of William the Third, and since that time,
we all know, there has been the freest animadversion upon the
conduct of the ministers of that nation. But is there anything
in the language of the constitution (much less in its spirit and
intention) which authorizes one man to impute crimes to another
for which the law has provided the mode of trial, and the degree
of punishment? Can it be presumed that the slanderous words,
which, when spoken to a few individuals, would expose the
speaker to punishment, become sacred, by the authority of the
constitution, when delivered to the public through the more
permanent and diffusive medium of the press? Or, will it be
said, that the constitutional right to examine the proceedings
of government extends to warrant an anticipation of the acti
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of the legislature or the judgments of the court? and not only
to authorize a. candid commentary upon what has been done, but
to permit every endeavor to bias and intimidate with respect to
matters still in suspense? The futility of any attempt to establish a construction of this sort must be obvious to every intelligent mind. The true liberty of the press is amply secured by
permitting every man to publish his opinions; but it is due to the
peace and dignity of society to enquire into the motives of such
publications, and to distinguish between those which are meant
for use and reformation, and with an eye solely to the public
good, and those which are intended merely to delude and defame.
To the latter description, it is impossible that any good government should afford protection and impunity."
The second sentence quoted declares that the expression of
thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man.
But the statement of an alleged fact is not the expression of
either a thought or an opinion. To print a falsehood is not one
of the invaluable rights of man. It is not a right at all. On the
contrary, it has never been anything but a wrong. The last
clause of the sentence is broader in its terms, guaranteeing the
right to speak, write and print on any subject, but the one
enjoying this liberty shall be responsible for its abuse. Mr.
Justice Mercur in Barr v. Moore, 87 Pa. 385, 1878, says:
"The liberty of the press should at all times be justly guarded
and protected; but so should the reputation of an individual
against calumny. The right of each is too valuable to be encroached on by the other. Hence, another part of the section
just cited declares 'the free communication of thoughts and
opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man, and every citizen may freely speak, write, and print on any subject, being
responsible for the abuse of that liberty.' Thus it appears this
right or liberty is not one of unlimited license; but it is restrained by a legal responsibility."
The publisher being responsible for the "abuse" of his liberty,
the only question is as to the meaning of "abuse." It must mean
either one or two things: Either intemperate comment upon
the truth, or the publication of that which is not true. Which
of these is it more likely to mean? Surely the latter. Surely
any editor would prefer to feel that he is unhampered in his
comments, and is responsible only for the truth of that which he
alleges than that he could he held responsible for his expressions
of opinion only. If this qualification means the latter, and no
one will pretend that it means the former, then the constitution
has already sanctioned a law like the present. Judge Thayer is
clearly of this opinion. He says in Com. v. McClure, 3 W. N. C.
58, 1876:
"The press, in making statements which reflect upon the personal character and integrity of individuals, are bound to exer-
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cise the greatest care and diligence in ascertaining the truth of
what they print before they print it. The neglect of that care
and diligence is the negligence intended by the constitution.
If they print false statements, injurious to the character of individuals, without having exercised such care and diligence, they
are guilty of negligence, and are not protected by the constitution. They are, it is true, justified in acting upon reliable
human testimony of credible persons, who illege they have
knowledge of the facts whch they communicate. All the transactions of life are based upon such testimony. -But they must
be held to the highest degree of good faith and of care. If this
were not so every man's reputation would be at their mercy, no
matter how upright and stainless he might be. The constitution
is a shield for the honest, careful, and conscientious press. It
will not permit itself to be made a cover for malice, or for negligent or malicious slanders . . . ." There is the general
declaration, in the first place, that the press shall be free, and
that it shall be untrammelled; that nobody shall undertake to
prescribe what a newspaper shall publish nor what it shall refrain
from publishing; that there shall be no censorship of the press.
There is, on the other hand, the counterbalance that they who do
publish shall do it upon their responsibility. That responsibility
;.of a twofold kind.
"If they publish what is false, or if they publish even what
is true upon an occasion which is not justified by law, or what
is not a privileged publication, they do it upon their personal
responsibility, and they may be sued for it in a civil court, or
held to answer for it in a criminal court." It is for.the legislature to decide whether they shall use all the rope given them by
the constitution, as to which I express no opinion.
(2.) The second objection, which was the only one seriously
argued by the opponents of the bill or replied to .by its supporters, is curiously enough of no validity whatever. It is said
that the law applies only to certain of the newspapers of the
state excluding others, and hence is special legislation and unconstitutional.
There is a widespread idea that if a law is special, i. e., does
not apply to all individuals of a particular class, it is necessarily
unconstitutional. Such is not the fact. The seventh section of
Article II of the constitution prohibits special or local legislation
upon a large number of subjects, including the most common
subjects of legislation, but there is not one which by any twist
of logic can be construed to include the subject matter of the
present law. The inquiry, therefore, as to whether the law does
apply to all the newspapers in the state is of no importance, for
there is nothing in the constitution of Pennsylvania to prevent
the legislature from passing a special law regulating the civil
liability of the publishers or editors of newspapers if it sees fit
to do so.
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The eighth section of the same article provides that where a
special or local law is passed publication must be made in the
manner provided by law thirty days before the 'ntroduction of
the bill. The courts, however, have construed this clause, as
they have the one requiring three readings on separate days, as
directory merely, and hence binding only on the conscience of
the legislative body. It cannot, therefore, be inquired into afte
the passage of the act Perkins v. Phila., 156 Pa. 554, 1893.
Thomas Raeburn White.

